Whereupon, perspectives of “war” may not frame the best narrative, but rather of finding means to achieve “peace”, both across and within nations, within ourselves, and in harmony with the flow of the Earth.
The series of COP climate change conferences has now clocked up to number “30”, and effectively returned to its roots, in Brazil; in fact in Belém, rather than Rio de Janeiro, which in June 1992, hosted the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), widely known as the "Earth Summit". That landmark event led to the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which established the basic legal framework for international climate change cooperation. The annual climate change conferences, known as the Conference of the Parties (COP), stemmed from this original convention.
Nonetheless, the global combustion of fossil fuels (and accordingly emissions), has continued to climb relentlessly, despite such a sustained series of COPs, leading some to question their value. Indeed, 2024 saw record amounts of each, coal, oil, and natural gas, being burned, with accordingly record CO2 emissions, although some reassurance might be drawn from the fact that emissions from land use changes were down from the previous year.
COP30 marks the passing of ten years since the Paris Agreement of COP21 was accorded, and yet, as was pointed out by Sir David King:
"New global analyses show that average warming over the past three years has already exceeded 1.5°C, the threshold nations agreed in Paris we should avoid 'if at all possible.' But global averages hide the reality people are already experiencing. Parts of the Arctic, Central and Eastern Europe, and North America are now 3–7°C hotter than pre-industrial levels. Whether this overshoot is brief or prolonged will shape the stability of societies for decades.”
Hope from China?
It is noteworthy that China’s emissions actually fell in 2024 (albeit by just 1%), significantly as a consequence of its installation of immense levels of wind and (particularly) solar energy. Another contributing factor to falling emissions is contraction in the construction sector, which consumes most of China’s cement and steel production (although this is somewhat offset by surging growth in the industrial sector, and demand for oil).
The series of COP climate change conferences has now clocked up to number “30”, and effectively returned to its roots, in Brazil; in fact in Belém, rather than Rio de Janeiro, which in June 1992, hosted the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), widely known as the "Earth Summit". That landmark event led to the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which established the basic legal framework for international climate change cooperation. The annual climate change conferences, known as the Conference of the Parties (COP), stemmed from this original convention.
Nonetheless, the global combustion of fossil fuels (and accordingly emissions), has continued to climb relentlessly, despite such a sustained series of COPs, leading some to question their value. Indeed, 2024 saw record amounts of each, coal, oil, and natural gas, being burned, with accordingly record CO2 emissions, although some reassurance might be drawn from the fact that emissions from land use changes were down from the previous year.
COP30 marks the passing of ten years since the Paris Agreement of COP21 was accorded, and yet, as was pointed out by Sir David King:
"New global analyses show that average warming over the past three years has already exceeded 1.5°C, the threshold nations agreed in Paris we should avoid 'if at all possible.' But global averages hide the reality people are already experiencing. Parts of the Arctic, Central and Eastern Europe, and North America are now 3–7°C hotter than pre-industrial levels. Whether this overshoot is brief or prolonged will shape the stability of societies for decades.”
Hope from China?
It is noteworthy that China’s emissions actually fell in 2024 (albeit by just 1%), significantly as a consequence of its installation of immense levels of wind and (particularly) solar energy. Another contributing factor to falling emissions is contraction in the construction sector, which consumes most of China’s cement and steel production (although this is somewhat offset by surging growth in the industrial sector, and demand for oil).
In addition, the newer Chinese coal fired power stations are more efficient, since they employ supercritical and (ultra-supercritical) water as a heat-transfer medium, with higher temperature inputs to the “heat engine”, up to 565 degrees (and up to 600-610 degrees) Celsius, meaning that the reckoned efficiency is increased from about 33-37% (sub-critical) to 37-40% and 44-46% respectively.
For reference, advanced combined cycle gas fired stations can now achieve above 50% and potentially as much as 60%. While all such improvements represent a considerable saving in CO2 emissions per unit of electricity generated, they do not obviate the need to phase out fossil fuels as far as possible, and in short order, especially as at current emissions levels, we look almost certain to breach the 1.5 degree limit, with just 3 years remaining of the global carbon budget, or virtually no time at all.
Adaptation.
Thus, adaptation is being emphasised, not to relinquish mitigation, but in partnership with it, to build durability and flexibility in the face of changes that are now inevitable. These include more obvious actions like defending against sea-level rise, but also rendering buildings both more energy efficient, and more “liveable” in expectedly hotter conditions, and developing “water resilience” – to deal with floods and droughts – by adapting the built environment, and making natural landscapes better at absorbing and storing water.
Adaptation measures are probably easier for most people to grasp – “your home will flood, so do this to reduce the impact” - but mitigation may appear as a more nebulous concept, hence why infrastructural and legislation changes are needed to make it happen.
One potential wildcard, is the waning of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), which adds uncertainties to how we might prepare a country such as the UK to own its “food security” in the future, since it will be necessary to grow more of what is actually consumed here. Currently this amounts to about half of the food eaten, as produced on 35% of the UK mainland area, which could be reduced to a mere 7%, should the AMOC fail substantially by the end of this century.
Thus, we may be caught – proverbially and literally – between the devil and the deep blue sea, since massive and volatile forces of extreme cooling and heating may beset us, as conclusive evidence has been presented that humanity has failed to “limit warming to well below 2°C”.
This really does call out the question of “what next?” since the adaptation measures we adopt will have to cover all bases, in terms of which particular crops to grow, the introduction of natural climate solutions, which infrastructures – including building designs and transportation networks (think melting road surfaces and buckling rail tracks) - will serve us best, and how to use the available energy, and all other resources, to best effect in an increasingly turbulent world.
Financial considerations.
COP30 focussed heavily on “climate finance”, since a major consideration is how the richer nations will release funds to the poorer ones, mainly in the Global South, to assist them in meeting their climate change targets, to mange debt, and ensure a just transition away from fossil fuels. The likely sums required are substantial, and it has been noted that:
The developed world must massively scale up financial flows to Emerging Markets and Developing Economies(EMDEs).
“...at least USD 2.4 trillion per year by 2030 and USD 3.3 trillion per year by 2035 to meet their needs for the clean energy transition, adaptation and resilience, response to loss and damage, natural capital, and just transition.”
Investments in nature-based solutions (NbS) remain far below what is needed:
“The UNEP State of Finance for Nature (2023) estimates that annual financing for NbS must more than double, from about USD 200 billion today to over USD 400 billion by 20305, to align with global climate, biodiversity and land restoration goals.”
Investments in adaptation and resilience also need to be scaled up significantly.
“Well-designed adaptation investments deliver a “triple dividend”: they avoid future losses, generate positive economic returns, and create broader social benefits. Yet the adaptation finance gap remains stark. Global adaptation needs are estimated at USD 215–387 billion annually by 2030, while international public flows reached only USD 28 billion in 2022.”
However, the costs (not just fiscal, but in terms of an unravelling fabric of human civilization) of failing to make a “class act” across the world, are most likely incalculable, or at any rate, unthinkable. Yet, think we must, to avoid catastrophe, as the concerted threads of the polycrisis tighten, and its web finally begins to break.
Fragmentation, wars and critical resources.
At a time when humans need to cooperate, probably as never before in our history, "fragmentation" seems to be a common denominator in the current condition of the world The effects of "ecological overshoot" (which are matrix elements of the climate and nature crisis) lever a multiplicity of divisions, as a result of the depletion of natural capital and the resulting competition for scarcer resources, which puts greater strain on ecosystems, economies, international relations and societal solidarity. This can only diminish our capacity for resilience as a society, and indeed, “social cohesion erosion”, “livelihood crises” and “mental health deterioration" were three of the five top global risks previously identified in a report by the World Economics Forum.
Of actual wars, there seems little shortage, and the flame seems to rise relentlessly under the cauldron of global hostility. Indeed, a study from the Transition Security Project has shown that critical minerals needed for solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles and battery storage are being diverted to support the military, rather than contributing to decarbonising the global civil-energy system. There is mention too of "AI-driven warfare", which I read as an indicator that human judgement is being increasingly sidelined in deciding the fate of “humanity”. Alarmingly, Mark Rutte, Nato’s secretary general, has warned that Russia could attack a Nato country within the next five years, venturing that “The dark forces of oppression are on the march again,” and that Europe “...must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents and great-grandparents endured.”
Meanwhile, the world’s existing militaries are reckoned to be responsible for around 5.5% of global emissions. Active conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction will add significantly to this figure (along with all other impacts): thus, it has been estimated that Russia's war in Ukraine has generated emissions equivalent to the combined annual output of Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
Copper is a critical material for the expansion of a largely electrified (“renewable”) energy system, and yet “peak copper” looms, with higher prices and relentless material decline projected from beyond 2035. Not only are copper ores becoming poorer in quality, but copper mines are getting deeper, making the extraction process more resource intensive, and expensive. Substitution is another prospect for circumventing resource limitations, for example using aluminium in place of copper wires in buildings.
Adaptation.
Thus, adaptation is being emphasised, not to relinquish mitigation, but in partnership with it, to build durability and flexibility in the face of changes that are now inevitable. These include more obvious actions like defending against sea-level rise, but also rendering buildings both more energy efficient, and more “liveable” in expectedly hotter conditions, and developing “water resilience” – to deal with floods and droughts – by adapting the built environment, and making natural landscapes better at absorbing and storing water.
Adaptation measures are probably easier for most people to grasp – “your home will flood, so do this to reduce the impact” - but mitigation may appear as a more nebulous concept, hence why infrastructural and legislation changes are needed to make it happen.
One potential wildcard, is the waning of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), which adds uncertainties to how we might prepare a country such as the UK to own its “food security” in the future, since it will be necessary to grow more of what is actually consumed here. Currently this amounts to about half of the food eaten, as produced on 35% of the UK mainland area, which could be reduced to a mere 7%, should the AMOC fail substantially by the end of this century.
Thus, we may be caught – proverbially and literally – between the devil and the deep blue sea, since massive and volatile forces of extreme cooling and heating may beset us, as conclusive evidence has been presented that humanity has failed to “limit warming to well below 2°C”.
This really does call out the question of “what next?” since the adaptation measures we adopt will have to cover all bases, in terms of which particular crops to grow, the introduction of natural climate solutions, which infrastructures – including building designs and transportation networks (think melting road surfaces and buckling rail tracks) - will serve us best, and how to use the available energy, and all other resources, to best effect in an increasingly turbulent world.
Financial considerations.
COP30 focussed heavily on “climate finance”, since a major consideration is how the richer nations will release funds to the poorer ones, mainly in the Global South, to assist them in meeting their climate change targets, to mange debt, and ensure a just transition away from fossil fuels. The likely sums required are substantial, and it has been noted that:
The developed world must massively scale up financial flows to Emerging Markets and Developing Economies(EMDEs).
“...at least USD 2.4 trillion per year by 2030 and USD 3.3 trillion per year by 2035 to meet their needs for the clean energy transition, adaptation and resilience, response to loss and damage, natural capital, and just transition.”
Investments in nature-based solutions (NbS) remain far below what is needed:
“The UNEP State of Finance for Nature (2023) estimates that annual financing for NbS must more than double, from about USD 200 billion today to over USD 400 billion by 20305, to align with global climate, biodiversity and land restoration goals.”
Investments in adaptation and resilience also need to be scaled up significantly.
“Well-designed adaptation investments deliver a “triple dividend”: they avoid future losses, generate positive economic returns, and create broader social benefits. Yet the adaptation finance gap remains stark. Global adaptation needs are estimated at USD 215–387 billion annually by 2030, while international public flows reached only USD 28 billion in 2022.”
However, the costs (not just fiscal, but in terms of an unravelling fabric of human civilization) of failing to make a “class act” across the world, are most likely incalculable, or at any rate, unthinkable. Yet, think we must, to avoid catastrophe, as the concerted threads of the polycrisis tighten, and its web finally begins to break.
Fragmentation, wars and critical resources.
At a time when humans need to cooperate, probably as never before in our history, "fragmentation" seems to be a common denominator in the current condition of the world The effects of "ecological overshoot" (which are matrix elements of the climate and nature crisis) lever a multiplicity of divisions, as a result of the depletion of natural capital and the resulting competition for scarcer resources, which puts greater strain on ecosystems, economies, international relations and societal solidarity. This can only diminish our capacity for resilience as a society, and indeed, “social cohesion erosion”, “livelihood crises” and “mental health deterioration" were three of the five top global risks previously identified in a report by the World Economics Forum.
Of actual wars, there seems little shortage, and the flame seems to rise relentlessly under the cauldron of global hostility. Indeed, a study from the Transition Security Project has shown that critical minerals needed for solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles and battery storage are being diverted to support the military, rather than contributing to decarbonising the global civil-energy system. There is mention too of "AI-driven warfare", which I read as an indicator that human judgement is being increasingly sidelined in deciding the fate of “humanity”. Alarmingly, Mark Rutte, Nato’s secretary general, has warned that Russia could attack a Nato country within the next five years, venturing that “The dark forces of oppression are on the march again,” and that Europe “...must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents and great-grandparents endured.”
Meanwhile, the world’s existing militaries are reckoned to be responsible for around 5.5% of global emissions. Active conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction will add significantly to this figure (along with all other impacts): thus, it has been estimated that Russia's war in Ukraine has generated emissions equivalent to the combined annual output of Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
Copper is a critical material for the expansion of a largely electrified (“renewable”) energy system, and yet “peak copper” looms, with higher prices and relentless material decline projected from beyond 2035. Not only are copper ores becoming poorer in quality, but copper mines are getting deeper, making the extraction process more resource intensive, and expensive. Substitution is another prospect for circumventing resource limitations, for example using aluminium in place of copper wires in buildings.
Although an increased fire hazard was identified (reckoned by 55 times), it is thought that much of this was caused by problems with connectors, rather than the Al wires themselves, and incorrect installation practices. Al has a larger coefficient of expansion/contraction than Cu, and so this can cause greater tension, and "breaks", sparking etc. Aluminium is still extensively used for electrical transmission in power grids, since not only is it cheaper, but has about 1/3 the density of copper (with 61% of its conductivity), meaning that the same current can be carried using around half the weight of material.
Demand reduction.
Demand reduction (and waste avoidance) is one of the most powerful tools available for mitigation. Thus, dietary and food system changes [including place based (local) food growing, and more of what we eat being derived from plants], relocalisation, better energy use, and lower consumption of “stuff”, could cut emissions by 40–70%. As part of a Natural Climate Solutions approach, it has been shown that switching the UK to a more plant based diet could free up an area of land the size of Scotland, and which could be used to “trigger a rural renaissance that supports farmers changing to different farming methods, enhances nature restoration and builds flood water protection.” It has also been found that mixing six plant species (two grasses, two legumes and two herbs) increased crop yields by up to 18%, even with much lower nitrogen fertiliser use. Thus, introducing plant diversity is an effective strategy for demand reduction in producing food.
Nonetheless, such strategies tend not to dominate in COP or national agendas. Instead, incremental technological improvements are stressed, while leaving highly consuming and impacting lifestyles, particularly in the wealthier nations, largely unrestrained. Overall, the outcome of COP30 has proved disappointing, among which curbing fossil fuel use was not stated explicitly in the final agreement, despite significant pressure and demands from many nations (like the EU, UK, and small island states) for stronger language.
Without reducing demand, the emissions gap is unlikely to be closed by supply-side measures alone. There is a considerable gulf between what has been offered by nations, in their nationally determined contribution (NDC) commitments, and what must be done, as is both a failure of too weak national targets and a lack of collective will to confront the real structural drivers of emissions, i.e. resource-intensive lifestyles and growth economic systems that depend upon unchecked consumption: relentless, until ultimately being braked by natural resource limits.
Peace?
So, what might we consider to be a state of “peace”, and how best might this be wrested from the polycrisis? Indeed, what kind of a world do we want, what do we need, and what is possible? Perhaps peace can be regarded as a state of “balance”, albeit impossible to achieve within a techno-industrial framework that relentlessly consumes limited oil as a “master resource”, but which is also a critical driver in breaching planetary boundaries.
This present course is “techno-fantasy”, according to David Holmgren’s definition, doomed to run-out, and with creative descent to achieve “Earth Stewardship” as the one option (out of four) that prevails into the future, to operate within the Earth’s limits. It has also been argued that a collective human hubris has contributed significantly to anthropogenic climate change and that a “humility-based approach” toward the environment is needed, entailing an “appreciation of humanity’s proper place in the natural order”.
Such wisdom is a feature of indigenous cultures, and traditional ecological knowledge, which should all be embraced in building a sustainable world. It is heartening that COP30 saw the Global Youth Call to Action voice the need for meaningful youth/Indigenous participation in National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Quite right too, as it is their future, and a fertile, nascent energy is an intrinsic feature of young minds.
Relocalisation is a key strategy, since it can both mitigate, and adapt to, the unavoidable effects of ecological overshoot. Mitigation is achieved through reduced consumption, production of food and energy at the local level, and creating less waste. Adaptation occurs through the creation of resilient, self-sufficient communities that can better cope with threats from supply chain failures, and the impacts of climate change. Thus, both the long-term sustainability of ecosystems and the well-being of local populations are supported.
This is in accord with thinking from Transition Towns, The Great Simplification, “The Simpler Way”, Ecovillages, Deep Adaptation, the Ecological Footprint Analysis, and “Lean Logic”, all of which converge on this point.
In summary: "The future will be smaller than the present."
How smooth, (“peaceful”) this inevitable transition will be is a moot issue, and the practical, cultural and logistic challenges of shifting downward in terms of material consumption from the status quo are complex. Degrowth has been identified as a prospective turning point in human development "as significant as the domestication of fire or the process of agrarianisation"; however, it is further opined that “[the Transition Movement] embraces ‘limits’ but downplays the implications of scarcity for open, liberal societies, and for inter-personal and inter-group violence.”
As translated from Omar Khayyam’s writings, centuries past:
“The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.”
What is done, is done, and we can only move forward. It is not yet “game over”, but to gear down from “ecological overshoot” to within planetary limits, requires historic shifts of intention, and we cannot simply switch back to the past (or a simulated version of it). Thus, adaptation to change is essential. We are in new, unfamiliar territory, and how we negotiate this is the challenge, or the journey’s course will be taken out of our hands.
Demand reduction.
Demand reduction (and waste avoidance) is one of the most powerful tools available for mitigation. Thus, dietary and food system changes [including place based (local) food growing, and more of what we eat being derived from plants], relocalisation, better energy use, and lower consumption of “stuff”, could cut emissions by 40–70%. As part of a Natural Climate Solutions approach, it has been shown that switching the UK to a more plant based diet could free up an area of land the size of Scotland, and which could be used to “trigger a rural renaissance that supports farmers changing to different farming methods, enhances nature restoration and builds flood water protection.” It has also been found that mixing six plant species (two grasses, two legumes and two herbs) increased crop yields by up to 18%, even with much lower nitrogen fertiliser use. Thus, introducing plant diversity is an effective strategy for demand reduction in producing food.
Nonetheless, such strategies tend not to dominate in COP or national agendas. Instead, incremental technological improvements are stressed, while leaving highly consuming and impacting lifestyles, particularly in the wealthier nations, largely unrestrained. Overall, the outcome of COP30 has proved disappointing, among which curbing fossil fuel use was not stated explicitly in the final agreement, despite significant pressure and demands from many nations (like the EU, UK, and small island states) for stronger language.
Without reducing demand, the emissions gap is unlikely to be closed by supply-side measures alone. There is a considerable gulf between what has been offered by nations, in their nationally determined contribution (NDC) commitments, and what must be done, as is both a failure of too weak national targets and a lack of collective will to confront the real structural drivers of emissions, i.e. resource-intensive lifestyles and growth economic systems that depend upon unchecked consumption: relentless, until ultimately being braked by natural resource limits.
Peace?
So, what might we consider to be a state of “peace”, and how best might this be wrested from the polycrisis? Indeed, what kind of a world do we want, what do we need, and what is possible? Perhaps peace can be regarded as a state of “balance”, albeit impossible to achieve within a techno-industrial framework that relentlessly consumes limited oil as a “master resource”, but which is also a critical driver in breaching planetary boundaries.
This present course is “techno-fantasy”, according to David Holmgren’s definition, doomed to run-out, and with creative descent to achieve “Earth Stewardship” as the one option (out of four) that prevails into the future, to operate within the Earth’s limits. It has also been argued that a collective human hubris has contributed significantly to anthropogenic climate change and that a “humility-based approach” toward the environment is needed, entailing an “appreciation of humanity’s proper place in the natural order”.
Such wisdom is a feature of indigenous cultures, and traditional ecological knowledge, which should all be embraced in building a sustainable world. It is heartening that COP30 saw the Global Youth Call to Action voice the need for meaningful youth/Indigenous participation in National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Quite right too, as it is their future, and a fertile, nascent energy is an intrinsic feature of young minds.
Relocalisation is a key strategy, since it can both mitigate, and adapt to, the unavoidable effects of ecological overshoot. Mitigation is achieved through reduced consumption, production of food and energy at the local level, and creating less waste. Adaptation occurs through the creation of resilient, self-sufficient communities that can better cope with threats from supply chain failures, and the impacts of climate change. Thus, both the long-term sustainability of ecosystems and the well-being of local populations are supported.
This is in accord with thinking from Transition Towns, The Great Simplification, “The Simpler Way”, Ecovillages, Deep Adaptation, the Ecological Footprint Analysis, and “Lean Logic”, all of which converge on this point.
In summary: "The future will be smaller than the present."
How smooth, (“peaceful”) this inevitable transition will be is a moot issue, and the practical, cultural and logistic challenges of shifting downward in terms of material consumption from the status quo are complex. Degrowth has been identified as a prospective turning point in human development "as significant as the domestication of fire or the process of agrarianisation"; however, it is further opined that “[the Transition Movement] embraces ‘limits’ but downplays the implications of scarcity for open, liberal societies, and for inter-personal and inter-group violence.”
As translated from Omar Khayyam’s writings, centuries past:
“The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.”
What is done, is done, and we can only move forward. It is not yet “game over”, but to gear down from “ecological overshoot” to within planetary limits, requires historic shifts of intention, and we cannot simply switch back to the past (or a simulated version of it). Thus, adaptation to change is essential. We are in new, unfamiliar territory, and how we negotiate this is the challenge, or the journey’s course will be taken out of our hands.
